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ABSTRACT 
 
This study tests if the financial markets price the investor’s sentiment risk. We construct portfolios 
based upon the stock returns’ exposure to sentiment. Our results show that the portfolio returns 
are positively correlated with the exposure of stocks to sentiment. The strategy that consists of 
buying stocks with the highest exposure to sentiment and selling stocks with the lowest exposure to 
sentiment generates a significant raw profit. Exploring the sources of profit, we find that neither 
the traditional risk factors nor the momentum factor can account for the profit. However, we find 
that the addition of the sentiment risk premium contributes to explain the profit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
ver the last decade, investor sentiment has become one of the most widely studied theoretical and 
empirical areas in finance. In fact, the relationship between investor sentiment and asset valuation has 
led to many memorable debates. It is highly probable that this relationship will continue to catch the 
attention of a growing number of academics and professionals.  
  
Several theoretical studies have modeled the role of investor sentiment in the financial markets (e.g., Black, 
1986; De Long et al., 1990). In these studies, the economy is characterized by two types of investors: professional 
investors who rationally anticipate asset prices and noise traders (i.e. individuals) whose expectations lead to periods 
of over, or undervaluation, of financial assets. Both types of investors are risk adverse and the equilibrium price 
reflects everyone’s expectations. It follows that noise traders’ sentiment influences asset prices. The theoretical 
studies point out to that asset prices can significantly diverge from fundamental values. Moreover, because arbitrage 
has practical limits, rational investors fail to fully offset the effects of noise trader’s sentiment. Thus, the “noise 
trader risk”, also known as the "sentiment risk", becomes a priced factor by financial markets.  
 
The risk introduced by noise traders in the financial markets may not be diversifiable, because their views 
are correlated and affect many assets. Therefore, assets subject to “noise trader risk” should provide higher returns 
than assets not subject to that risk, and their price should be below their fundamental value. As noted by Lee et al., 
(1991, p.81) "Like fundamental risk, noise trader risk arising from the stochastic investor sentiment will be priced in 
equilibrium. As a result, assets subject to noise trader risk will earn a higher expected return than assets not subject 
to such risk. Relative to their fundamental values, these assets will be underpriced". 
 
Most empirical studies have explored the predictive ability of investor sentiment on the cross-section of 
stock returns (Solt and Statman, 1988; Brown and Cliff, 2005). Very few studies have tested the existence of noise 
trader’s systematic risk priced by financial markets. According to Zweig, (1973), this type of tests is essential as the 
question of whether investor sentiment drives returns is necessary but insufficient condition for the noise trader 
hypothesis. Additionally, the studies undertaken often led to different conclusions
1
. Some studies show that financial 
                                                 
1 We refer the reader to a famous exchange of 1993 in the Journal of Finance between Chopra et al., on one side and Chen et al., 
on the other. 
O 
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markets do not price psychological factors (Elton et al., 1998; Sias et al., 2001; Glushkov, 2006). Others studies find 
that sentiment is an important factor in the return generating process of common stocks (Lee et al., 2002; Kumar and 
Lee, 2006; Ho and Hung, 2008).  
 
The sentiment risk introduced by noise traders in the financial markets is therefore an open empirical 
question. The difficulty is that there is no recognized model to estimate the risk premium induces by noise traders. 
The main purpose of this study is to propose a new approach for studying the link between asset prices and 
sentiment risk. Specifically, we establish a new measure of sentiment which includes both direct, and indirect, 
sentiment indicators. The measure is constructed from the principal component analysis (first component) of six 
measures of sentiment identified in previous literature. This composite index provides a better measure of sentiment 
by condensing the state of mind of a very large sample of investors (consumer confidence index, investors 
intelligence index, closed-end funds discounts, mutual funds flows, the average monthly first-day returns on IPOs 
and the number of IPOs). Focusing on the concept of a sentiment risk premium, we implement the trading strategy 
that consists of buying stocks most impacted by the sentiment factor and selling stocks less impacted by the 
sentiment factor in the past 36 months. We show that such a strategy can lead to a significant raw profit and we find 
that the traditional risk factors cannot account for the high profit. The profit of this trading strategy is then analyzed, 
using a new model of asset pricing. The model takes into account a risk premium linked to investor’s psychology.  
 
The article is structured as follows. In the second section, we present the data collected and the proxy used 
to quantify the sentiment variable. The methodology used to evaluate the raw profit of the trading strategy, outlined 
above, is the subject of the third section. In the fourth section, we study the sources of the profit. In the fifth section, 
the robustness of our results is presented. Finally, the main results are summarized in the conclusion. 
 
2. DATA    
 
The sample includes all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) currently or formerly listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ between July 1981 and December 2008, thus avoiding survivorship bias. Stock returns, 
market capitalizations and book-to market equity ratios (B/M) are collected from the merged CRSP-Compustat 
database. For a security to be included in the sample, 36-month of consecutive returns must be available
2
.  
 
Investor sentiment can be defined as the component of expectations about asset returns not warranted by 
fundamentals. A bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above (below) those justified by the fundamental 
indicators. According to Shefrin (2005, p.213) “In finance, sentiment is synonymous with error.” For the proponents 
of behavioral finance these errors, when aggregated, are reflected in the asset prices. In the case of the irrational 
exuberance characterizing technology stocks in the years 2000 for instance, investor sentiment has been regarded as 
been overly optimistic. 
 
Different kinds of proxy have been proposed in the literature to estimate the unobservable variable 
sentiment. The sentiment indicators can be grouped into two categories: direct measures and indirect measures. 
Direct measures of investor sentiment are based on opinion polls that directly ask individuals how they feel about 
current or future economic and stock market conditions. Indirect measures represent economic and financial 
variables susceptible to capture the overall investors’ state of mind.  
 
This study uses a composite indicator which combines direct and indirect sentiment measures. The strength 
of the composite indicators is that they take into account multiple sources of information. A composite indicator, 
thus, reflects better the changes of investors’ sentiment than any measure used individually3. Following the 
methodology outlined in Baker and Wurgler (2006), the aggregate index is constructed from a principal component 
analysis (first component) of six measures of sentiment identified in previous studies: University of Michigan 
consumer confidence index (UMI), investors intelligence index (II), the average monthly first-day returns on IPOs 
(RIPO), the number of IPOs in a given month (NIPO), the net new cash flows of US equity mutual funds (FLOW) 
                                                 
2 We only include nonfinancial firms with positive B/M.  
3 This hypothesis will be revisited in the fourth section.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  685 
and finally the closed-end funds discount (CEFD). This choice is supported by the following three facts. First, our 
selection is the result of the established relationship between each selected sentiment index and the equity market. 
Prior studies show that each sentiment index seizes some of the stock market aspects not already contained in 
traditional macro-economic indicators. Second, although both direct and indirect measures of investor sentiment 
have been employed in previous studies, it remains unclear as to witch measures are actually the most appropriate, 
and to what extent they represent the same informational content. We find it reasonable to infer that combining 
several imperfect measures using both the direct and indirect approaches would lead to a better one. Third, data 
availability narrows the options; some indicators are only available over short time periods.The list of variables and 
the sources of data used for the construction of the composite sentiment index are presented in appendix 1.  
 
It is very likely that some of the sentiment measures described above are related to the current and future 
economic situation. To mitigate this possibility, all sentiment measures are orthogonalized with respect to several 
contemporaneous economics variables. Similar to previous studies, we use data on growth of industrial production 
(IP), inflation (INF), term spread (TS), default spread (DS) and growth in durable (DC), nondurable (NDC) and 
services consumption (SC). The composite sentiment index (CSI) is as follows: 
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The first principal component explains about 58% of the total variation in the macro-adjusted sentiment 
proxies. We can see that all individual sentiment measures obtain a similar weight (around 0.2) within the overall 
equation for the CSI. We find that the coefficients of the sentiment indicators have all the expected signs. They are 
positive for the survey data, the variables related to IPOs and mutual fund flows. The negative sign on the closed-
end funds discount is consistent with the interpretation of investor sentiment, the greater the discount, the more 
investors are bearish.    
 
 
Figure 1: Composite sentiment index, July 1981 to December 2008 
This figure shows the development of the composite sentiment index over time. The composite sentiment index is the first 
principal component of six sentiment proxies: the consumer confidence index, the investors intelligence index, the average 
monthly first-day returns on IPOs, the number of IPOs, the mutual funds flows and the closed-end funds discount. The composite 
sentiment index is based on sentiment proxies adjusted for growth of industrial production, inflation, term spread, default spread 
and growth in durable, nondurable and services consumption.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the composite indicator during the period from July 1981 to December 
2008. The indicator drops sharply in the year 1987, it reaches its lowest level in November 1987. This situation 
coincides with the market crash of October 19, 1987. Significant decreases are also seen during the collapse of the 
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bonds market in 1994 and during the collapse of LTCM in 1998. Moreover, we note an increase of the composite 
index at the peak of the market in 2000. Over the period 1998-2003, the composite index reaches its highest level in 
March 2000
4
. This date coincides with the peak of the Dot.com. The composite index starts to decrease in April 
2000; this decline accelerates after the attacks of September 11, 2001. As anticipated, the index also shows a large 
decrease in 2008 during the so-called sub-prime crisis. Overall, the composite sentiment index produces a faithful 
reproduction of the bubbles and crashes during study period.  
 
3. THE SENTIMENT STRATEGY  
 
If the sentiment risk is priced by stock markets, the stocks most sensitive to the sentiment variable should 
produce higher returns than the stocks less sensitive to the sentiment variable. In other words, the strategy consisting 
of buying portfolios of stocks with greater exposure to sentiment and selling portfolios of stocks with the lower 
exposure to sentiment should generate a statistically significant raw profit. 
 
3.1.  The development of the strategy    
 
We perform a linear model
5
 to estimate the impact of investor sentiment on stock returns. To obtain a time 
series of sentiment betas, we use the following approach: starting from August 1984
6
, we regress the monthly 
returns of each stock on the variations of composite sentiment indicator over the window [t-1, t-36]. The absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient is our measure of the sensitivity of stock to sentiment factor in month t. We then 
proceed by rolling forward by one month all the way to December 2008. The estimated model is as follows: 
 
1-36,...t-t      (2)    ,,    itiii CSIR  
 
On the basis of sentiment betas estimated in model (2)
7
, we sort all the stocks included in our sample into 
ten portfolios. Specifically, each month, we rank all the stocks into ten portfolios using the ascending absolute value 
of the sentiment betas. Portfolio 1 contains the stocks least impacted by investor sentiment and portfolio 10 the 
stocks the most impacted. As the betas are estimated on a rolling basis of a one month, we investigate the sentiment 
portfolio returns on a holding horizon of a month
8
. We compute the monthly portfolio return as a value-weighted 
average of all stocks in the portfolio.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sentiment betas. The average beta of portfolios comprising 
stocks the most sensitive to sentiment factor is about 1.110. The average beta of portfolios comprising stocks the 
least sensitive to sentiment factor is about 0.017. Note that some stocks do not appear to be impacted by the 
sentiment factor, their average beta is zero. By contrast, others stocks show a strong dependence to the sentiment 
factor, their sentiment betas reach 12.14.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The fluctuations of the composite index during the speculative bubble of 2000 (Internet bubble) are much less significant than 
the fluctuations during the crash of October 1987. One possible explanation is that the fall in prices in 1987 has been more drastic 
(about 23% in one day) than during the Internet bubble (the decrease took place over several months). 
5 We use a model similar to Wang (2004) and Glushkov (2006).  
6 As the sentiment beta is calculated over a period of 36 months, the first estimation starts in August 1984. 
7 In our sample, the vast majority of the stocks have a positive sentiment beta (approximately 92% of the stocks). The negative 
sentiment betas indicate that some investors are adopting "negative feedback" strategies; i.e. buying stocks when their prices fall 
and selling when prices rise. Shefrin and Statman (1994) consider that certain behavioral biases are pushing investors to adopt 
"positive feedback" strategies while other cognitive biases lead them to adopt "negative feedback” strategies. 
8 This strategy can be generalized to periods of k months (3, 6, 9 and 12 months).  
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Table 1: Sentiment betas and firm characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics of sentiment betas (mean, minimum and maximum) and some characteristics of the 
sentiment portfolios. The sentiment portfolios are formed each month by sorting stocks based on their exposure to the sentiment 
factor. The last two columns correspond to the time series average of the cross-section mean of market capitalization and the time 
series average of the cross-section mean of book-to-market equity ratio. The last line contains the difference between the 
characteristics of portfolio 10 and 1 and the corresponding t-stat. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Portfolios Mean Min Max 
Market capitalization 
($mil) 
Book-to-market ratio 
1. Low exposition 0.017 0.000 0.181 2076.530 0.725 
2 0.056 0.003 0.552 2052.121 0.700 
3 0.097 0.004 0.931 2060.480 0.704 
4 0.142 0.010 1.363 2021.672 0.684 
5 0.193 0.011 1.883 2034.123 0.634 
6 0.254 0.012 2.584 1923.370 0.675 
7 0.322 0.021 3.481 1900.883 0.655 
8 0.435 0.022 4.663 1729.650 0.671 
9 0.601 0.042 6.513 1342.461 0.688 
10. High exposition 1.110 0.072 12.140 487.893 0.698 
10-1 
(t-stat) 
 
-1588.64 
(-6.623)*** 
-0.0277 
(-0.857) 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of the sentiment portfolio returns 
Each month from August 1984 to December 2008, all stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their exposure to 
sentiment factor and assigned to one of ten portfolios. Portfolio 1 contains the stocks least impacted by investor sentiment and 
portfolio 10 the stocks the most impacted. The average monthly return of each portfolio is presented in this table. The column 
titled Market beta represents the time series average of the cross-section of the mean of traditional beta coefficient of each 
portfolio. The column, turnover rate, is the time series average of the cross-section mean of the number of stocks removed from a 
specific portfolio divided by the initial number of stocks in the portfolio. August 1984 is used as reference to identify the initial 
number of stocks in each portfolio.  
Portfolios Mean Market beta Min Max Turnover rate 
1. Low exposition 0.0095 0.903 -0.186 0.140 5.85 % 
2 0.0102 0.902 -0.232 0.118 7.65 % 
3 0.0103 0.934 -0.256 0.133 7.42 % 
4 0.0114 0.897 -0.245 0.120 14.45 % 
5 0.0104 0.943 -0.218 0.128 23.34 % 
6 0.0116 0.949 -0.211 0.126 14.65 % 
7 0.0152 1.002 -0.238 0.228 14.67 % 
8 0.0159 1.112 -0.279 0.154 8.56 % 
9 0.0189 1.379 -0.331 0.249 7.45 % 
10. High exposition 0.0196 1.366 -0.246 0.185 6.45 % 
 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the constructed portfolio returns. Results in the table indicate that 
the stocks most influenced by the sentiment factor earn higher returns than the stocks less impacted by the sentiment 
factor. The portfolio returns (except portfolio 5) increase when they include the stocks most sensitive to sentiment 
factor. Portfolio 1 earns an average return of 0.95% and portfolio 10 provides an average return of 1.96%. Results 
also show that the portfolios 1 and 10 are relatively stable; the average turnover does not exceed 7%.        
 
3.2.  The raw profit of the sentiment strategy  
 
To test whether the differences between our portfolio returns are statistically significant, we perform t tests 
for the mean portfolio returns. As the strategy is to buy the stocks most influenced by the sentiment factor and sell 
the stocks least influenced by the sentiment factor, we use portfolio 1 as a benchmark for the significance tests. 
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Table 3: The raw profits for sentiment strategies 
Each month from August 1984 to December 2008, all stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their exposure to 
sentiment factor and assigned to one of ten portfolios. Portfolio 1 contains the stocks least impacted by investor sentiment and 
portfolio 10 the stocks the most impacted. This table presents the raw profits for sentiment strategies which consist of buying a 
portfolio exposed to the sentiment factor and selling the portfolio the least exposed to this factor. The portfolio 1 is used as a 
benchmark for the significance tests. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Strategies Mean t-stat P-value 
Portfolio 10 - Portfolio1 0.010 1.803** 0.035 
Portfolio 9- Portfolio1 0.009 1.606* 0.054 
Portfolio 8- Portfolio1 0.006 0.892 0.186 
Portfolio 7 - Portfolio1 0.005 0.823 0.205 
Portfolio 6 - Portfolio1 0.002 0.817 0.207 
Portfolio 5 - Portfolio1 0.000 0.754 0.225 
Portfolio 4 - Portfolio1 0.001 0.664 0.253 
Portfolio 3 - Portfolio1 0.000 0.400 0.344 
Portfolio 2 - Portfolio 1 0.000 0.264 0.395 
 
 
Table 3 presents the raw profits, t-stats and p-values for the difference in mean returns tests. Results show 
that the difference in mean returns between portfolio 10 and portfolio 1 is about equal to 1% per month, for annual 
raw profit of 12%
9
. This difference is significantly different from zero at 5%. The t-stat and p-value of the strategy 
consisting of buying portfolio 10 and selling portfolio 1 are respectively 1.803 and 0.035. Results also show that the 
difference in mean returns between the portfolio 9 and 1 is significant at 10%. However, for the other portfolios, the 
differences in mean returns are not significant at conventional levels.  
 
Overall, the stocks that have higher exposure to sentiment factor earn greater returns than stocks with lower 
exposure to sentiment. Notice however, that the portfolios that generate the highest returns are also those having the 
highest traditional risk (see Tables 1 and 2). These portfolios are characterized by higher traditional beta coefficients 
and small market capitalizations. This finding may suggest that high returns observed for these portfolios are just a 
compensation for traditional risk bearing.  
 
4. THE SOURCES OF PROFIT  
 
In the previous section, we found that the sentiment strategy generates a raw profit statistically significant. 
Portfolios of stocks more sensitive to the sentiment factor earn significantly higher returns than portfolios less 
sensitive to that factor. This section explores the sources of the sentiment strategy’s profit.  
 
4.1.  The impact of traditional risk  
 
To examine whether the traditional risk explains the high returns of portfolios most sensitive to sentiment, 
we use the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). In addition to momentum, the model allows for the control of the 
market risk, the risks associated with firm size and the B/M ratio. The model is shown in equation (3):  
 
(3)     )( ,,,,, tptptptptftmpptftp UMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR    
 
Rp is the portfolio rate of return, Rf is the risk-free rate of return (one-month bill rate), Rm-Rf is the market 
return in excess of the risk-free rate, SMB is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of small 
                                                 
9 From an operational perspective, it is important to study the profit of the sentiment strategy with transaction costs. Indeed, a one 
month investment strategy may lead to very high transaction costs. To account for this limitation, we recalculate the profit of the 
sentiment strategy using a longer investment horizon of six months. We find that this strategy leads to a significant annual profit 
of about 11.9%. If portfolios 1 and 10 are rebalanced every six months, they will lead to four trades per year, implying that the 
transaction costs must be at least 2.975% per trade to absorb the entire profit. This number appears quite high. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) found that transaction costs do not exceed 0.5% per trade for institutional investors. In conclusion, the strategy 
developed in this study remains profitable even with transaction costs.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  689 
stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML is the difference between the value-
weighted return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks, 
UMD is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-
12 to t+2 and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with low returns during months t-12 to t+2, and εp is 
the residual return on the portfolio. The intercept, αp, measures the average monthly abnormal return. The monthly 
time series of these factors are obtained from Ken French’s data library.  
 
Table 4 presents the regression results. The adjusted R
2
 are high in all cases, although somewhat lower for 
the tow portfolios most exposed to sentiment factor. These portfolios also exhibit the largest alpha coefficients. The 
portfolios most (least) exposed to sentiment exhibit a positive and significant excess return of 0.7% (-0.2%) at a 
threshold of 5%. The F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) is 2.763 and the associated critical probability 
is 0.0028. The null hypothesis that the ten constants obtained from the estimation of model (3) are equal to zero can 
be rejected at the usual threshold of 1%. Therefore, we conclude that exposure to traditional risk does not explain the 
returns of the portfolios most sensitive to the sentiment factor. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression of monthly excess returns on portfolio risk factors of Carhart (1997) 
This table reports the factor model estimates for the ten sentiment portfolios. The multi-factor model is as follows: 
tptptptptftmpptftp UMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR ,,,,, )(    
Rp is the portfolio rate of return, Rf is the risk-free rate of return, Rm-Rf is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate (one-
month bill rate), SMB is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of small stocks and the value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks 
and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks, UMD is the difference between the value-weighted return of a 
portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with low 
returns during months t-12 to t+2, and εp is the residual return on the portfolio. The Newey-West adjusted t-values of the 
coefficient estimates are reported in the parentheses. The FGRS is the F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) testing the 
null hypothesis that the intercepts are jointly zero.  
Portfolios  Alpha Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD Adjusted R² 
1. Low exposition 
-0.002          
(-0.987) 
0.968        
(29.425) 
-0.097          
(-2.412) 
0.022        
(0.542) 
-0.091          
(-3.329) 
0.846 
2 
-0.002          
(-0.826) 
0.911        
(31.542) 
-0.089          
(-2.615) 
0.292         
(6.627) 
-0.037          
(-1.767) 
0.852 
3 
-0.0001        
(-0.995) 
0.993      
(31.763) 
-0.062          
(-1.409) 
0.129        
(2.652) 
-0.067          
(-1.428) 
0.842 
4 
-0.0006        
(-0.289) 
0.983        
(28.129) 
-0.077          
(-1.973) 
0.167         
(3.181) 
0.015        
(0.409) 
0.812 
5 
-0.0004        
(-0.365) 
0.969     
(34.983) 
-0.123          
(-3.873) 
0.298      
(4.442) 
-0.094          
(-1.434) 
0.898 
6 
0.0001         
(0.876) 
0.912        
(32.124) 
-0.159          
(-3.987) 
0.065        
(0.934) 
-0.017          
(-0.946) 
0.866 
7 
0.002      
(1.407) 
1.099      
(33.176) 
-0.186          
(-5.098) 
-0.051         
(-0.105) 
-0.123          
(-3.983) 
0.868 
8 
0.003      
(1.498) 
1.076       
(30.567) 
0.013         
(0.248) 
-0.185         
(-3.743) 
0.005        
(1.638) 
0.852 
9 
0.006        
(2.412) 
1.221     
(20.454) 
0.321        
(5.192) 
-0.287         
(-3.098) 
-0.019          
(-0.389) 
0.765 
10. High exposition 
0.007        
(3.156) 
1.154      
(21.121) 
0.187         
(1.965) 
-0.322         
(-4.165) 
0.010            
(0.323) 
0.782 
FGRS =2.763                P-value GRS = 0.0028 
 
 
Results also show that the portfolios most sensitive to sentiment have higher systematic risk than the 
portfolios less impacted by sentiment. Sensitivity to the market risk is 0.968 for the portfolio of stocks with lower 
sensitivity to the sentiment factor, while it is 1.154 for the portfolio with higher sensitivity to sentiment factor. 
Similarly, we find that the returns of portfolios least exposed to the sentiment factor covary negatively with SMB 
while the returns of portfolios most exposed to sentiment covary positively with SMB. This result indicates that the 
portfolios which are most sensitive to sentiment contain more small capitalizations stocks than the other portfolios. 
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This result is consistent with that of most previous studies (e.g., Lee et al., 1991; Kumar and Lee, 2006)
10
. We also 
note that the returns of portfolios least exposed to the factor sentiment covary positively with the factor HML while 
the returns of portfolios most exposed to sentiment covary negatively with the factor HML. This indicates that the 
portfolios most (least) impacted by sentiment include more low (high) B/M stocks.   
 
Findings also indicate that the regression coefficients for the factor momentum are negative for almost all 
the portfolios although they are significant only for the portfolios less vulnerable to the sentiment factor (portfolios 1 
and 2). This result indicates that the portfolios least exposed to sentiment factor include proportionally more stocks 
with low past performances. A possible explanation is that individual investors are attracted by stocks that have 
experienced good recent performance. This finding validates previous studies showing that noise traders adopt 
strategies of "positive feedback", i.e. they buy after prices increase and sell after prices decline (e.g., Solt and 
Statman, 1988). 
 
Overall, we conclude that neither the three risk factors of Fama and French (1993) nor the momentum 
factor can explain the abnormal returns of portfolios most sensitive to the sentiment factor
11
. Thus, a risk premium 
for the stocks most exposed to sentiment appears justified. 
 
4.2.  The impact of the sentiment risk  
 
Through this sub-section, we test the central hypothesis of investor sentiment theory; investor sentiment 
risk is a priced risk factor and requires a risk premium for any stocks that have an exposure to it. We propose a new 
asset pricing model to take into account a risk premium linked to investor’s psychology. To construct the portfolios 
mimicking risk factors related to size, B/M ratio and exposure to sentiment factor, we use the Fama-French portfolio 
approach. We form portfolios as the intersections of the three independent sorts:  size, B/M ratio and exposure to 
sentiment factor.    
 
4.2.1.  Construction of sentiment risk premium 
 
In June of each year t, all stocks are ranked by size and are grouped into three portfolios corresponding to 
the first three deciles (Small, (D1-D3)), the four median deciles (Medium, (D4-D7)) and the last three deciles (Big, 
(D8-D10)). Independent of the ranking described above, in December of each year t-1, all stocks are also sorted 
according to their B/M ratio, and again grouped into three portfolios respectively corresponding to: the first three 
deciles (Low, (D1-D3)), the four median deciles (Medium, (D4-D7)) and the last three deciles (High, (D8-D10)).  
 
Similarly, and independent of the previous rankings, stocks are arranged in June of each year t, according 
to their sensitivity to the sentiment factor using the absolute value of their sentiment betas. The stocks are then split 
into three portfolios. The first portfolio includes the stocks not exposed to sentiment factor (N, (D1-D3)). The 
second includes the stocks moderately exposed to sentiment factor (I, (D4-D7)) and the third portfolio includes the 
stocks most sensitive to the sentiment factor (E, (D8-D10)). 
 
The intersection of independent sorts of stocks into size, B/M ratio and sensibility to sentiment factor yield 
to 27 portfolios
12
 that are S/L/N, S/L/I, S/L/E, S/M/N, S/M/I, S/M/E, S/H/N, S/H/I, S/H/E, M/L/N, M/L/I, M/L/E, 
M/M/N, M/M/I, M/M/E, M/H/N, M/H/I, M/H/E, B/L/N, B/L/I, B/L/E, B/M/N, B/M/I, B/M/E, B/H/N, B/H/I and 
B/H/E. Monthly value-weighted returns for the 27 portfolios are calculated from July of year t to June t+1, and the 
portfolios are rebalanced in June of t+1. We construct a monthly portfolio return time series from July 1985 to June 
2008.  
 
                                                 
10 Previous studies find that investor sentiment mainly impact the small capitalizations. The studies justify this result by the fact 
that individual investors concentrate their holding in small capitalizations stocks, thus creating such a link.   
11 Model (2) was also estimated including the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). We find that this model does not 
explain the abnormal returns of portfolios 9 and 10. The results are not reported due to space limitation.  
12 The portfolios are indexed according to the following order: size/ B/M ratio/ exposure to sentiment. The descriptive statistics 
for the portfolios are in appendix 2.   
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The exposure to sentiment factor may be correlated with other variables that could also affect the 
relationship between risk and return. For example, we reported earlier that small firms are more sensitive to 
sentiment than big firms. This implies that a portfolio constructed using the sentiment factor may include a large 
number of small firms and portfolio returns could be affected by the size effect. To avoid confounding the size effect 
with the sentiment effect, the factors must be made perfectly orthogonal. This is why we build each factor 
neutralizing other factors using the procedure described below.  
 
The SMB factor corresponding to the difference between the monthly returns of the small  
capitalization portfolios and the big capitalization portfolios is given by the following equation: 
 
(4)   ]...............[
9
1
]...............[
9
1
////////////
*
EHBILBNLBEHSILSNLS RRRRRRSMB   
 
Similarly, the HML factor which corresponds to the difference between the monthly returns of the 
portfolios with high B/M ratio and the portfolios with low B/M ratio is calculated as follows: 
 
(5)   ]...............[
9
1
]...............[
9
1
////////////
*
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The EMN factor dedicated to replicate the sentiment risk premium is the difference between the monthly 
returns of the portfolios with higher exposure to sentiment factor and the portfolios with lower exposure to the 
sentiment factor:  
 
(6)   ]............[
9
1
]...............[
9
1
//////////// NHBNMSNLSEHBEMSELS RRRRRREMN   
 
Finally, our proxy for the market factor in stock returns is the excess market return, (Rm
*
-Rf). Rm
*
 is the 
return on the value-weighted portfolios of all stocks in our sample.  
 
The results depicted in Table 5 show that the risk premium linked to sentiment is positive: it is 0.46% per 
month over the period from July 1985 to June 2008. This factor is significant at 5%. The market portfolio records a 
monthly average return in excess of the risk free rate of 0.61%. The monthly premium associated with the risk factor 
SMB
*
 is 1.08%. It is significant at 1%. As to the factor UMD, it shows a significant average return of 0.89% at the 
1%. In contradiction with previously reported results, the factor HML
*
 exhibits a negative average return of -0.94%.  
 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for monthly returns of portfolio risk factors, July 1985 to June 2008 
This table reports the basic statistics of portfolio risk factors over the period July 1985 to June 2008. Rm
*-Rf is the market return 
in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month bill rate), SMB* is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of 
small stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML* is the difference between the value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks, UMD is the difference 
between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and the value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of stocks with low returns during months t-12 to t+2. EMN is the difference between the monthly returns of 
the portfolios with higher exposure to sentiment factor and the portfolios with lower exposure to sentiment factor. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Mean Std t stat Minimum Maximum 
R*m-Rf 0.0061 0.0412 2.459** -0.235 0.129 
SMB* 0.0108 0.0516 3.076*** -0.125 0.387 
HML* -0.0094 0.0462 -3.380** -0.283 0.133 
UMD 0.0089 0.0468 3.159*** -0.2500 0.183 
EMN 0.0046 0.0332 2.301** -0.0899 0.412 
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The correlation matrix among the factors presented in Table 6 shows that the risk premium related to the 
sentiment factor is weakly correlated with the premiums for HML
*
 and UMD. The correlations between the factors 
EMN and SMB
*
 and the factors EMN and Rm
*
-Rf are moderate, averaging 0.372 and 0.379 respectively. These low 
correlations appear to confirm the hypothesis that the information contained in the factor sentiment is not connected 
to other risk factors. The correlation between the other factors is also quite low with the exception of that recorded 
between size and B/M ratio. The correlation reaches the value of -0.498
13
.  
 
 
Table 6: The correlations of portfolio risk factors, July 1985 to June 2008 
This table presents the correlations among monthly returns of portfolio risk factors. Rm
*-Rf is the market return in excess of the 
risk-free rate (one-month bill rate), SMB* is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of small stocks and 
the value-weighted return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML* is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio 
of high B/M stocks and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks, UMD is the difference between the value-
weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and the value-weighted return of a portfolio 
of stocks with low returns during months t-12 to t+2. EMN is the difference between the monthly returns of the portfolios with 
higher exposure to sentiment factor and the portfolios with lower exposure to sentiment factor.  
 R*m-Rf SMB* HML* UMD EMN 
R*m-Rf 1     
SMB* 0.024 1    
HML* -0.345 -0.498 1   
UMD -0.072 0.109 -0.151 1  
EMN 0.379 0.372 -0.276 0.019 1 
 
 
4.2.2.  Towards a model incorporating a sentiment risk premium     
 
To test the hypothesis of a sentiment risk premium, we add the sentiment risk premium in the multi-factor 
model presented in the previous section. Our main interest concerns the sign and the significance level of abnormal 
return. If the risk sentiment is priced by the stock markets, abnormal returns should disappear or at least should be 
reduced. Abnormal returns are estimated with the constant from the following multi-factor model: 
 
(7) )( ,
**
,
*
,,, tptptptptptftmpptftp EMNeUMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR    
 
Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of the multi-factor model (7). The EMN variable is significant 
for the three portfolios the most sensitive to sentiment. The addition of the EMN variable in the model increases the 
explanatory power of these portfolio returns between 2 to 4%. Overall, the portfolios most exposed to sentiment are 
those have been the most impacted by the EMN variable. The returns of stocks the least exposed to sentiment 
(portfolio 1) covary negatively with EMN variable. In contrast, the returns of stocks most sensitive to sentiment 
covary positively with the sentiment risk premium.  
 
It is important to observe that the addition of a sentiment risk premium contributes to offset the abnormal 
returns of portfolios 9 and 10. The alpha coefficients for these portfolios are not significant at 5% level. The F-
statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) confirms this result. The null hypothesis, that the ten constants 
obtained after estimating the model (7) are equal to zero at the 5% level, is not rejected. The addition of the EMN 
factor helps to better explain the returns of portfolios 9 and 10.  
 
These results are consistent with the claims of the investor sentiment theory. The stocks most sensitive to 
sentiment earn greater returns than stocks less sensitive to sentiment as a compensation for bearing sentiment risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This correlation is very similar to that calculated using the database of Kenneth French. On the same period, it reaches -0.423. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  693 
Table 7: Regression of monthly excess returns on portfolio  
risk factors of Carhart (1997) including a risk sentiment factor 
This table reports the factor model estimates for the ten sentiment portfolios. The multi-factor model is as follows: 
tptptptptptftmpptftp
EMNeUMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR ,
**
,,
*
,, )(    
Rp is the portfolio rate of return, Rf is the risk-free rate of return, (Rm
*-Rf) is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate (one-
month bill rate), SMB* is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of small stocks and the value-weighted 
return of a portfolio of large stocks, HML* is the difference between the value-weighted return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks 
and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks, UMD is the difference between the value-weighted return of a 
portfolio of stocks with high returns during months t-12 to t+2 and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with low 
returns during months t-12 to t+2. EMN is the difference between the monthly returns of the portfolios with higher exposure to 
sentiment factor and the portfolios with lower exposure to sentiment factor and εp is the residual return on the portfolio.  
Adjusted R² shows the improvement of the adjusted R² after the addition of the sentiment factor. Number in bold indicates that 
the EMN variable is significant at the conventional levels. The Newey-West adjusted t-values of the coefficient estimates are 
reported in the parentheses. The FGRS is the F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) testing the null hypothesis that the 
intercepts are jointly zero.    
Portfolios Alpha R*m-Rf SMB* HML* UMD EMN Adjusted R²  Adjusted R² 
1. Low exposition 
0.003 
(1.109) 
0.899 
(28.768) 
-0.025 
(-0.815) 
0.099 
(2.165) 
-0.047 
(-1.879) 
-0.006 
(-0.345) 
0.855 0% 
2 
0.002 
(1.167) 
0.856 
(27.983) 
-0.023 
(-0.733) 
0.129 
(3.136) 
-0.045 
(-2.267) 
0.004 
(0.298) 
0.824 0% 
3 
-0.002 
(-1.298) 
0.918 
(30.982) 
-0.076 
(-1.287) 
-0.045 
(-1.976) 
-0.027 
(-1.374) 
0.031 
(1.588) 
0.856 0% 
4 
0.003 
(1.245) 
1.032 
(31.230) 
0.124 
(0.989) 
0.103 
(2.809) 
-0.134 
(-5.101) 
-0.043 
(-0.997) 
0.864 0.1% 
5 
0.001 
(0.897) 
1.111 
(31.098) 
0.126 
(2.029) 
-0.019 
(-0.222) 
0.034 
(0.293) 
0.047 
(1.699) 
0.726 0.2% 
6 
0.002 
(0.876) 
1.098 
(18.209) 
0.163 
(1.983) 
-0.187 
(-2.109) 
-0.035 
(-0.548) 
0.031 
(0.983) 
0.779 0% 
7 
-0.001 
(-0.657) 
1.189 
(19.987) 
0.049 
(1.289) 
-0.109 
(-1.837) 
-0.056 
(-0.653) 
0.019 
(0.726) 
0.687 0.2% 
8 
-0.002 
(-1.423) 
0.871 
(25.078) 
-0.055 
(-1.892) 
-0.004 
(-0.087) 
-0.165 
(-3.987) 
0.055 
(1.856) 
0.808 1.98% 
9 
0.003 
(1.098) 
0.966 
(26.526) 
-0.09 
(-1.923) 
0.098 
(1.321) 
-0.027 
(-0.562) 
0.086 
(2.113) 
0.786 2.28% 
10. High exposition 
0.002 
(0.982) 
0.927 
(29.728) 
-0.033 
(-1.546) 
0.076 
(2.565) 
-0.077 
(-2.879) 
0.097 
(2.657) 
0.837 3.98% 
FGRS =1.487              P-value GRS = 0.143 
 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS   
 
In this section, we conduct an analysis of the robustness of our results. First, we evaluate the relevance of 
the performance measure of sentiment portfolios. Second, we focus on studying the behavior of the stocks with a 
negative sentiment beta. Finally, we investigate the impact of using other sentiment indicators on profit of the 
sentiment strategy. 
 
5.1.  Relevance of the performance measure of sentiment portfolios 
 
5.1.1.  Relevance of the asset pricing model 
 
Until now, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model has been used to evaluate the portfolio returns. To ensure 
that the observed abnormal returns on the portfolios most impacted by sentiment factor are not the result of a model 
misspecification, we conduct a robustness test using another asset pricing model. In a recent study, Chen et al., 
(2011) propose an asset pricing model based on the q-theory of investment. This model explains anomalies such as 
momentum, failure probability, O-score, earnings surprises, accruals, net stock issues and stock valuation ratios. 
According to this model, the return on a portfolio in excess of the risk free rate would be based on its sensitivity to 
three risk factors: 
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(8)  )( ,,,,,,, tptROEptINVptftmpptftp RoRiRRRR    
 
 With: Rm-Rf is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate. RINV is the difference between the return on 
a portfolio of low-investment stocks and the return on a portfolio of high-investment stocks. RROE is the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of stocks with high returns on equity and the return on a portfolio of stocks with 
low returns on equity. 
 
 The results of the time-series regressions for the model (8)
14
 show that the returns of portfolios least 
sensitive to sentiment are well explained by the model. In contrast the portfolios most sensitive to sentiment 
continue to generate significant positive abnormal returns. We obtain significant abnormal returns of about 0.009 (t 
= 3.427) for portfolio 9 and 0.010 (t = 5.046) for portfolio 10. This finding suggests again that the traditional risk 
identified in the literature does not explain high returns of stocks with higher exposure to the sentiment factor. 
 
5.1.2.  Reliability of asset pricing models on the returns of industry portfolios 
 
Lewellen et al., (2010) consider the results of empirical tests from models of asset pricing ambiguous. 
Indeed, since asset pricing models produce an artificially high explanatory power of stock returns (a high R-
squared), their soundness is questionable. The authors suspect a high correlation between portfolio returns ranked by 
size and B/M ratio, and risk factors constructed according to the same criteria (SMB and HML). We believe that our 
empirical tests are not subject to this criticism because our main question relates to the sign and significance level of 
the abnormal return (regression constant). Nevertheless, the authors recommend to reconsider the reliability of the 
valuation models by using the portfolio returns formed according to characteristics other than those used for the 
construction of risk factors such as the industry portfolios. 
 
The results of the estimation of various asset pricing models on the returns of the ten industry portfolios are 
summarized in Table 8. Results show that the CAPM explain the return of ten industry portfolios. Indeed, we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the ten abnormal returns are jointly and significantly equal to zero at a 5% level. The 
F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken amount to 1.567 (p-value = 0.116). In contrast, all multi-factor models are 
rejected by the F-statistic at 5%. Note also that the abnormal returns of multi-factor model are higher than those 
obtained in the CAPM. The average magnitude of the abnormal return is: 0.11% in the CAPM, 0.21% in the Carhart 
four-factor model, 0.12% in Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang’s model and 0.14% in our model. 
 
Also, note that only one industry portfolio shows a significant positive abnormal return in the CAPM 
against two in Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang’s model and in our model. The Carhart model generates three cases of 
significant positive abnormal returns in the ten analyzed. Overall, we consider that our multifactor model has better 
performance than the Carhart model and a performance close to that displayed by the Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang 
model. 
 
5.2.  The behavior of securities with a negative sentiment beta 
 
Regressions conducted on our sample show that each month approximately 92% of the stocks have a 
positive beta sentiment. While the largest proportion of the stocks is evidenced by a positive sentiment beta, it is 
important to analyze the behavior of stocks with a negative sentiment beta. For this, we again use model (2) for the 
stocks having a negative sentiment beta.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The data are collected from Lu Zhang’s website. The results are not reported due to space limitation 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2012 Volume 28, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  695 
Table 8: Regressions of monthly excess returns on ten industry portfolios, July 1985 to June 2008 
This table reports the factor model estimates for ten industry portfolios. The asset pricing models used are the following: 
 
(i) The CAPM:  
                   tptftmpptftp RRRR ,,,,, )(    
(ii) The Carhart model :  
                            tptptptpftmtpptftp UMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR ,,, )(    
(iii) The Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang model: 
                             tptROEptINVptftmpptftp RoRiRRRR ,,,,,,, )(    
(iv) The Carhart model including the risk sentiment factor : 
 tptptptptptftmpptftp EMNeUMDmHMLhSMBsRRRR ,
**
,,
*
,, )(    
 
Rp is the industry rate of return (NoDur, Durbl, Manuf, Enrgy, Hitec, Telcm, Shops, Health, Utils and Other). Rf is one-month T-
bill rate. The ten industry portfolio returns are from Kenneth French’s Web site. The Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang factors are 
from Lu Zhang’s Web site .The FGRS is the F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) testing the null hypothesis that the 
intercepts are jointly zero. Number in bold indicates that the variable is significant at the conventional levels. All the t-statistics 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations. 
 NoDur Durbl Manuf Enrgy HiTec Telcm Shops Hlth Utils Other FGRS 
Mean   0.011 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.009  
t stat 4.464 2.113 4.167 4.334 2.327 2.638 3.257 3.896 4.115 3.202 
The CAPM   
 
α 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.000 
1.567 
(0.116) 
β 0.732 1.078 0.971 0.630 1.468 0.924 0.993 0.791 0.392 1.007 
tα 1.663 -0.974 1.645 2.455 -0.828 -0.408 0.204 1.378 1.655 -0.195 
 
The Carhart four-factor model  
 
α 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 
2.138 
(0.022) 
β 0.858 1.268 1.070 0.827 1.131 0.930 1.043 0.779 0.651 1.158 
s -0.194 0.191 0.001 -0.023 0.204 -0.278 0.028 -0.342 -0.138 -0.096 
h 0.271 0.715 0.296 0.059 -0.850 -0.085 0.171 -0.217 0.680 0.439 
m 0.062 -0.250 -0.013 0.050 -0.214 -0.081 -0.039 0.113 0.090 -0.061 
tα 0.797 -1.972 0.674 1.017 2.526 0.038 0.082 0.170 0.792 -1.987 
 
The Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang model  
 
α 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
1.894 
(0.046) 
β 0.965 1.073 1.057 0.677 1.127 0.965 1.063 0.904 0.518 1.116 
i  0.243 -0.034 -0.001 0.193 -0.905 0.510 -0.419 -0.039 0.237 0.108 
o  0.396 0.115 0.226 0.084 -0.413 -0.121 0.310 0.219 0.224 0.244 
tα 1.472 0.848 1.223 0.012 3.234 -0.424 -0.723 0.557 -0.901 -2.201 
 
The Carhart model augmented by risk sentiment factor  
 
α 0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 
1.982 
(0.035) 
β 0.797 1.194 0.982 0.710 1.055 0.908 0.981 0.681 0.601 1.113 
s -0.138 0.083 -0.078 -0.074 0.087 0.047 -0.066 -0.203 -0.129 -0.029 
h 0.351 0.714 0.288 0.485 -0.900 0.064 0.170 -0.103 0.713 0.526 
m 0.076 -0.229 -0.027 -0.034 -0.264 -0.084 -0.028 0.131 0.076 -0.041 
e 0.304 0.316 0.299 0.266 0.353 0.224 0.311 0.368 0.211 0.311 
tα 2.280 -1.120 1.512 1.062 1.541 0.027 -1.247 3.956 0.843 0.485 
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Figure 2 shows the portfolio returns based on their sensitivity to the sentiment factor. In general, we 
observe a positive relationship between portfolio returns and their exposure to the sentiment factor. On average, the 
portfolios most sensitive to sentiment have higher returns than the portfolios less sensitive to sentiment. The 
monthly returns of portfolio 10 are twice as large as those of portfolio 1. We conclude that stocks with negative 
sentiment betas have the same behavior as the positive beta stocks.   
 
 
Figure 2: Returns distribution of the portfolios based on their sensibility to the sentiment factor 
Theses graphs represent the evolution of the returns of portfolios based on their sensibility to the sentiment factor. Panel A shows 
the evolution of the returns of portfolios with negative sentiment beta. Panel B shows the returns of portfolios with positive 
sentiment beta. P1 (P10) represents the portfolios of stocks with the lowest (highest) exposure to the sentiment factor.  
 
Panel A: Portfolios with negative sentiment beta       Panel B: Portfolios with positive sentiment beta                      
                        
 
 
5.3.  Relevance of the synthetic sentiment indicator 
 
To measure investor sentiment, we used a composite index that summarizes the information contained in 
six individual measures previously identified in the literature (direct and indirect measures). This index has been 
preferred to a direct or indirect measure. This section investigates the relevance of this choice. 
 
One way is to compare the raw profit of our sentiment strategy with that obtained on the basis of direct or 
indirect measures. This analysis allows us to check whether our synthetic sentiment index is a better indicator than 
the individual measures traditionally presented in the literature. In addition, we study the raw profit of the strategy 
using two synthetic sentiment indicators frequently cited in the literature: (i) the Brown and Cliff (2004) composite 
sentiment index and (ii) the Baker and Wurgler (2006) composite sentiment index
15
. To this end, we re-estimate 
model (2) using a sentiment individual indicator or a sentiment synthetic indicator. 
 
Table 9 presents the raw profits of strategies based on each of six individual sentiment indicators used for 
the construction of the composite sentiment index. We find that the profits of strategies based on individual 
sentiment indicators are very low and not significant at 5%. Only the strategy based on the closed-end funds 
discount generates a statistically significant profit. This strategy records a profit of around 0.4% per month, a profit 
well below that of strategy based on our sentiment synthetic indicator. The last two columns of Table 9 depict the 
results of the two alternative synthetic sentiment indicators. When these synthetic measures are used, the profits are 
higher than those obtained on the basis of individual sentiment measures. Both strategies generate a raw profit 
statistically significant. Combining several sentiment indicators provide a better of investor’s sentiment than each 
individual indicator. The superiority of our composite measure seems to come from the simultaneous effect of the 
combination of both the direct and the indirect indicators. 
 
                                                 
15 Brown and Cliff’s data are available for the period July 1981 to December 1998. As far as Baker and Wurgler’s composite 
sentiment index is concerned, data are available for the period July 1981 to December 2007.  
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Table 9: Raw profits of the strategy using a sentiment individual measure or a sentiment synthetic measure 
This table presents the raw profits of strategies based on each of six individual sentiment indicators used for the construction of 
our composite sentiment index and for two alternative composite sentiment indexes. II is the investors intelligence index; UMI is 
the consumer confidence index; NIPO are RIPO are the average monthly first-day returns on IPOs and the number of IPOs, 
respectively; FLOW is the mutual funds flows; CEFD is the closed-end funds discount. BC is the Brown and Cliff composite 
sentiment index and BW is the Baker and Wurgler composite sentiment index. The strategy consists of buying the portfolio the 
most sensitive to sentiment (portfolio 10) and of selling the portfolio the least sensitive to sentiment (portfolio 1). ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 II UMI NIPO RIPO FLOW CEFD BC BW 
Raw profit of the strategy : 
(Portfolio 10- Portfolio 1) 
0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.004* 0.009** 0.007* 
t-stat 0.298 -0.542 0.454 0.099 0.463 1.298 1.706 1.342 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
Previously published finance literature has focused primarily on the ability of sentiment indicators to 
predict the cross-section of stock returns. Unlike most previous works, we proposed a new approach linking the 
sentiment risk factor to asset prices. This approach provides a better understanding of investor’s sentiment role in 
the return generating process for common stocks.  
 
Using a composite sentiment index which includes several direct and indirect indicators identified in the 
previous literature, we construct portfolios based on the exposure of stocks to sentiment factor. We find that the 
portfolio returns increases when they include the stocks most sensitive to the sentiment factor. The strategy 
consisting of buying portfolios of stocks most sensitive to sentiment and selling portfolios of stocks less sensitive to 
sentiment generates a raw profit statistically significant. Exploring the sources of profit, we show that conventional 
risk does not explain the high returns of portfolios most affected by the sentiment factor. However, the addition of a 
new risk factor- dedicated to replicate the sentiment risk- contributes to better explain the returns of these portfolios.  
      
Our results, validated by several robustness tests, provide convincing support to the thesis of a sentiment 
risk premium priced by stock market. We conclude that investor sentiment should be considered as a factor 
influencing asset prices. Fund managers should be advised to take investor sentiment into account in the asset 
valuation models.  
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APPENDIX 1:  Description of the variables used for the construction of the composite sentiment index 
 
Code Variables Measures Sources 
Investor sentiment indicators 
UMI Consumer sentiment index 
Five questions making up the 
consumer sentiment index 
University of Michigan 
Survey Research Center 
II Investors Intelligence index Bull minus Bear spread Investors Intelligence 
NIPO Number of IPOs Number of IPOs in a given month http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter 
RIPO First-day returns on IPOs 
Average monthly first-day returns 
on IPOs 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter 
FLOW 
Net new cash flows of US equity 
mutual funds 
(Inflows-outflows)/Total asset 
Investment Company Institute 
http://www.ici.org/index.html 
CEFD Closed-end funds discount 
Equal-weighted average difference 
between the NAV of closed-end 
fund and the stock price of fund 
Wall Street Journal 
CSI Composite sentiment index 
First component from the principal 
component analysis of six measures 
of sentiment 
 
Macroeconomics variables 
IP Growth of industrial production 
Change in the natural logarithm of 
industrial production index 
Federal reserve system 
INF Inflation 
Change in the natural logarithm of 
the Consumer Price Index 
Federal reserve system 
TS Term spread 
Difference between the yields on 
10-year U.S. government bonds and 
3-month Treasury bills 
Federal reserve system 
DS Default spread 
Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond 
yield less the Aaa-rated corporate 
bond yield 
Datastream 
DC, NDC and 
SC 
Growth of durable goods, non-
durable goods and services 
consumption expenditures 
Change in the natural logarithm of 
durable goods, non-durable and 
services consumption expenditures 
Federal reserve system 
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APPENDIX 2:  Summary statistics for monthly returns of portfolios ranked on size, B/M ratio and exposure 
to sentiment factor, July 1985 to June 2008 
 
We form 27 portfolios as the intersections of the three independent sorts: size, B/M ratio and exposure to sentiment factor. 
Monthly value-weighted returns for the 27 portfolios are calculated from July of year t to June t+1, and the portfolios are 
rebalanced in June of t+1. This table presents summary statistics of the 27 portfolios. Panel A presents the average monthly 
returns. Panel B reports the standard deviation of returns. 
 
   B/M ratio    
  Low Medium High   
  Panel A : Mean   
M
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et
 c
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Small 
0.033 0.028 0.015 Low 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 t
o
 s
en
ti
m
en
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
0.030 0.029 0.017 Moderate 
0.032 0.032 0.019 High 
Medium 
0.037 0.015 0.001 Low 
0.010 0.018 0.050 Moderate 
0.039 0.021 0.006 High 
Big 
0.010 0.010 0.009 Low 
0.020 0.018 0.019 Moderate 
0.026 0.009 0.016 High 
       
   B/M ratio    
  Low Medium High   
  Panel B : Standard deviation   
M
a
rk
et
 c
a
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Small 
0.149 0.106 0.058 Low 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 t
o
 s
en
ti
m
en
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
0.123 0.104 0.065 Moderate 
0.109 0.237 0.068 High 
Medium 
0.096 0.055 0.048 Low 
0.093 0.067 0.052 Moderate 
0.088 0.051 0.049 High 
Big 
0.081 0.039 0.079 Low 
0.062 0.051 0.063 Moderate 
0.055 0.052 0.058 High 
 
